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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most developing economies can not grow without borrowing to ﬁnance the technology gains
and capital deepening that come with economic progress. On the other hand, high levels
of debt are (again) increasingly accused of deleterious eﬀects on economic development, in
what appears to be a revival of a 20-year-old debate on the virtues of debt relief. The
notion of debt overhang is coming back to the forefront, and with it a renewed interest in
empirical work identifying what countries have reached the downward segment of a debt
Laﬀer curve, and why. This paper is part of that eﬀort.
Theoretical arguments supporting the existence of a debt Laﬀer curve fall into two
broadly deﬁned categories. First are theories based on multiple equilibria, where investment
endogenously collapses beyond a certain level of indebtedness, in preparation for default and
in order to minimize penalty payments, exogenously assumed to equal a ﬁxed proportion of
output. Second are theories where the nature and terms of the optimal debt contract are
aﬀected by the level of existing indebtedness. As debt levels rise, it becomes increasingly
diﬃcult, and eventually impossible, for a creditor with imperfect monitoring technology to
elicit eﬀort on the part of the debtor. The borrowing economy then loses all incentives to
implement policies that are painful in the short-run but beneﬁcial in the long-run.
In this paper, we evaluate the plausibility of these (relatively) old theories in (relatively)
recent data, using modern empirical techniques. We do this in two steps. First, we imple-
ment standard reduced form growth regressions, with a view to selecting a panel of countries
that have eﬀectively gone through a debt overhang episode in a sample of 87 developing
economies. Our selection device is simple. We use a variety of kernel estimators to charac-
terize the relation between debt and growth at diﬀerent levels of indebtedness. This veriﬁes
whether economic growth depends non-monotonically on debt levels without imposing any
restriction on the shape of the non-linearity, quadratic or otherwise. In other words, we
investigate the existence and shape of a hypothetical debt Laﬀer curve in the developing
world. This also identiﬁes precisely the level of debt at which the sign reversal occurs,
i.e. the maximum point on the Laﬀer curve, again without any parametric restrictions.
Overhang countries are deﬁned as those going through this reversal in sample.1
We pay special attention to the possibility that high indebtedness and low growth arise
simultaneously from omitted variables. This is illustrated in the substantial diﬀerences that
exist between the debt Laﬀer curve implied by growth regressions with or without country-
speciﬁc intercepts. The estimated number of countries on the downward segment of the
debt Laﬀer curve is much larger without any ﬁxed eﬀects, which suggests that in many a
case, low growth and high debt occur for time-invariant, country speciﬁc reasons. This is
conceptually very diﬀerent from debt overhang, which rests fundamentally on a dynamic
argument, i.e. on the within-country variation in the panel.2 We use our kernel approach
to identify the variables that aﬀect both indebtedness and growth. In particular, we isolate
1Timing issues are treated with care. We estimate the (conditional) eﬀect of initial debt on subsequent
economic growth, and illustrate the importance of simultaneity bias in the context of these growth regressions.
2Even in the case of an economy particularly prone to overhang problems for institutional reasons (for
instance one where creditors can only monitor loans imperfectly), the variation of interest remains over time
and within-country. There, debt overhang can be particularly severe once the threshold level of indebtedness
is reached, but it will be absent at lower levels, in the same exact way it would be in a country with good
creditors’ rights.
2the sample of overhang countries as implied by (kernel) growth regressions without country
ﬁxed eﬀects, and investigate which controls aﬀect the signiﬁcance of the eﬀe c to fd e b ti n
a sample where it is initially signiﬁcantly negative. We focus in particular on institutional
characteristics of the economy.
The paper’s second step involves departing from reduced form growth regressions, and
performing direct tests of the mechanisms that underpin the debt Laﬀer curve. Overhang
countries are regrouped in a balanced panel which we subject to an event study, where the
onset of debt overhang is the shock whose chronology we seek to characterize. We use our
non-parametric estimates to date the threshold level of indebtedness, and ask three questions
of the event study. First, is investment falling precipitously about the overhang date?
Theories of optimal default suggest investment should respond at or after the overhang date,
but not before. A collapse in investment prior to the overhang date would be suggestive that
an explosion of the debt to GDP ratio is a symptom, rather than the cause of an investment
slump. Second, is economic policy observably deteriorating at or after the overhang date?
Theories of optimal debt contracts suggest incentives alter as a result of reaching a threshold
level of indebtedness; again, the reverse timing is suggestive of reverse causality. Third, do
the terms under which borrowing is contracted worsen noticeably at the threshold debt
level? There, debt overhang occurs because creditors become unable to write incentive
compatible contracts with highly indebted debtors, and choose instead to exact punitive
premia. This eﬀect should be tempered somewhat in environments where creditors are
protected, or have access to monitoring technologies that limit debtors’ moral hazard, as
for instance in economies with developed ﬁnancial markets.
Our results are as follows. Most of our estimates are supportive of a debt Laﬀer curve - or
at least a negatively sloped relation between debt and growth at high levels of indebtedness.
On average, debt overhang occurs when the face value of debt reaches 55 to 60 percent
of GDP or 200 percent of exports, or when the present value of debt reaches 35 to 40
percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Then, initial debt tends to be associated with
subsequently low growth. These thresholds apply within-countries, accounting for country-
speciﬁc institutional arrangements. They are valid for the average developing economy in
our sample. Still, institutions do matter for debt and growth. In particular, we ﬁnd that
government eﬀectiveness, the rule of law and bureaucratic quality all correlate positively
with economic growth, and tend to limit debt build-up. Debt overhang may still happen in
economies endowed with good institutions, but for higher values of debt.3
The event study provides clear support for a fall in investment after the onset of over-
hang. We uncover some evidence that economic policy -in particular price stability- deteri-
orates. Indices capturing the overall quality of economic policy markedly worsen once the
overhang threshold is reached. Interest rates on new borrowing, on the other hand, tend
to fall. This runs contrary to the theory, but can actually stem from extensive rationing.
Indeed, we ﬁnd that at the overhang date, quantities lent by the private sector collapse
precipitously, and the bulk of lending originates then from multilateral oﬃcial agencies, at
concessional rates.
We ascertain our results indeed arise because of overhang mechanisms, and rule out the
following two prominent alternatives. First, we consider the possibility that world interest
3Our event study ignores this heterogeneity, in that it uses the average estimated overhang threshold for
all countries.
3rates soared during our sample, with the resulting crowding out of investment particularly
prevalent amongst highly indebted economies. Actually, debt service tends to fall over
the event chronology - a result that is consistent with falling interest rates, but not with
crowding out eﬀects on investment. In addition, we ﬁnd only muted decreases in investment
during overhang episodes in countries where property rights are strongly enforced. This is
consistent with the notion that creditors are best able to monitor debtors when the required
institutions are present, and thus continue to be able to sign optimal debt contracts even
at high levels of indebtedness. But again, this is inconsistent with global interest rate
shocks aﬀecting investment indiscriminately amongst highly indebted economies. By the
same token, we ﬁnd important diﬀerences in the sample formed by low income overhang
countries, relative to the rest of our events. Low income economies seem to suﬀer the
brunt of the overhang eﬀects we identify. Since both sub-samples have by deﬁnition similar
indebtedness levels, this suggests once more ours is not a story of high world interest rates
hampering investment in high-debt countries.
Second, we ensure our results are not driven by the debt crisis of the 1980’s and the
ensuing wave of debt rescheduling agreements. In theory, rescheduling may alleviate over-
hang issues, in that it could bring the debtor back in the region where incentive-compatible
contracts are possible, and investing in the future optimal. In practice however, measures
of external debt do respond to restructuring episodes. In other words, we may exclude some
countries from our sample of overhang events simply because, in sample, debt ratios fall
back below our estimated thresholds once rescheduling occurs. This tends to exclude cases
when incentives might actually have altered as theory predicts, and thus acts against us
ﬁnding any evidence of overhang mechanisms. If anything, excluding rescheduling episodes
should reinforce our results. We investigate this in two ways. First, we simply eliminate
all years between 1979 and 1984 from our sample, and continue ﬁnding the same dynamics.
Second, we eliminate from our sample all substantial rescheduling episodes.4 The same con-
clusions obtain: debt relief may improve investment and economic policy, but is unlikely to
ease borrowing conditions, as the private sector comes back to take over from concessional
loans.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We set the stage in section 2 with a
helicopter tour of the theoretical mechanisms whereby unsustainable debt hampers economic
growth. We also review some of the recent (and less recent) empirical evidence. We next
present, in section 3, our measurement strategy and detail our considerable dataset. Section
4 contains the body of our results, separated into parametric and non-parametric estimates
of a debt Laﬀer curve. We also discuss the role of country ﬁxed eﬀects in aﬀecting economic
growth and debt accumulation simultaneously. Section 5 then describes the event of interest
- the onset of debt overhang - and tracks its impact on investment, policy choices and the
terms of borrowing. Section 6 reviews some robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes.
2O v e r h a n g O v e r v i e w
We review the literature on debt sustainability and the theoretical mechanisms whereby
(high level) debt can have deleterious eﬀects on economic growth. We stress in particular
4We choose to eliminate all episodes that reschedule more than 5 percent of the face value of debt.
4three mechanisms, based on the increasing diﬃculty in writing incentive-compatible debt
contracts as the level of debt rises, and in particular the possibility that default become
optimal at high debt levels. We also review the relevant empirical work.
Krugman (1988) deﬁnes debt overhang as a situation where “the expected present value
of future country transfers is less than the current face value of its debt”. In an overhang
situation it may still be proﬁtable for debt lenders to roll over the debt in order to recoup
part of their claims and extract some future country resources. However, if these in turn
depend on the debtor’s eﬀort, creditors will have to take into account the incentives eﬀects
of demanding further payments. If all future debtor’s resources are to be used to repay its
creditors, there will be little incentive to follow policies that may be painful in the short run
but growth-enhancing in the long-run. An optimal debt contract strikes a balance between
two constraints: on the one hand the necessity to set repayments high enough so that lucky
outcomes will eﬀectively generate transfers back to creditors, but exorbitant demands would
compromise any willingness on the debtor’s part to increase or even maintain its ability to
repay.5 The higher the level of debt, the harder it becomes to preserve incentives When the
optimal incentive-compatible contract implements a positive level of eﬀort, a suboptimal
contract - like the one that forces maximum repayment - will reduce eﬀort, expected growth
and therefore the present value of repayments as well. This is the basis for a debt Laﬀer
curve: the present value of debt repayments ﬁrst increases in debt’s face value, up to a
point beyond which the correlation becomes negative. Then, a higher face value of debt is
associated with lower eﬀort, and lower present value of repayments. As long as the ability
to repay depends on growth performance, the negative portion of the debt Laﬀer curve also
correspond to a negative correlation between debt and growth, where increasing debt tends
to be associated with worsening policy choices.
An important question is why some countries lay on the right side of the debt Laﬀer
curve, even though debt forgiveness would be Pareto-improving. A classical explanation
builds on a free rider problem: while all lenders collectively would be better-oﬀ ﬁnancing a
portion of the debt and forgiving the rest, each lender taken individually would prefer to
opt out of the roll-over and demand full repayment.
Piketty (1997) shows there might be situations where even a debt contract that elicits
high eﬀort on the borrower’s part can itself be suboptimal. In highly indebted economies, or
ones with poor institutions, signing debt contracts that preserve the borrower’s incentives
to repay becomes increasingly diﬃcult. Creditors prefer to give up incentives altogether,
expect high repayments only if a lucky state of nature realizes, and thus exact prohibitive
conditions from the borrower. The level of debt where creditors eschew incentive-compatible
contracts is the maximum in a debt Laﬀer curve, as beyond this level borrowers do not try
anymore to maintain or improve their ability to pay. We should observe a deterioration in
the terms of borrowing along with a lower mean growth.
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) show that Krugman (1988) debt overhang problem can
be reformulated as the outcome of a simple two-period consumption-investment decision.
Suppose that a debtor country has to make a risky investment decision while an inherited
stock of debt is due to mature the following period. For a given investment, a higher
debt level increases the number of states of nature where default occurs. Assuming that the
5Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997) provide a general characterization of this problem and its
dynamic implications
5default penalty is proportional to output, the inherited debt plays the role of an eﬀective tax
on investment: as default becomes more likely or optimal, the borrower’s purpose becomes to
minimize penalty payment, that is minimize future output, for instance reducing investment.
Inherited liabilities have a debt overhang eﬀect on investment. Once again, debt forgiveness
will increase investment as well as the present value of debt repayments.
Krugman (1988) suggests that a way to escape the trade-oﬀ between debt forgiveness (to
preserve incentives) and debt ﬁnancing (to obtain maximum repayment in good states of the
world) is to convert debt into state-contingent claims. Cohen and Sachs (1986) and Cohen
( 1 9 9 5 )d e v e l o pt h i sv i e wi na ni n ﬁnite horizon model of debt andg r o w t hw i t har i s ko fd e b t
repudiation. At ﬁrst, high growth is ﬁnanced with increasing debt to GDP ratios until an
endogenous debt ceiling is reached. When the credit constraint binds, growth performance
depends on the repayment strategy followed by creditors, and its implication on debtors
incentives. The optimal repayment strategy is to let the performing debt assets grow with
the expected growth of the economy. If this is implemented, growth is faster than under
a u t a r k ya n dac r o w d i n gi ne ﬀect ensues, with debt service negatively correlated with the
borrower’s investment decisions. But such a “smooth payments” policy requires that the
creditor be able to monitor the borrower’s investment strategy. If the nature of institutions
or contractual arrangements are such that monitoring cannot be ensured, the creditors
optimal strategy is to claim a constant share of output. This amounts to a distortionary
debt tax on output, leads to ineﬃciently depressed levels of investment and low growth.
The terms of borrowing for highly indebted economies should once again worsen observably
once the overhang zone is reached, and the severity of this response should depend on the
creditors ability to monitor borrowers’ investment policy.
Finally, the political economy can shed some light on the reasons why countries end up
highly indebted, but this literature does not address directly the mechanisms that link debt
and growth. For instance Velasco (1997) shows that fragmentation in ﬁscal authorities can
create a tragedy of commons, which results in overspending and excessive debt accumula-
tion.6 Alesina and Tabellini (1989), in turn, explain why successions of government with
diﬀerent distributional goals creates ﬁscal uncertainty that generates capital ﬂight, low in-
vestment and over-accumulation of external debt. There, high debt and low growth prevail
simultaneously because of institutions that are prone to over-borrowing, and that tend to
divert investment from eﬃcient uses, rather than as cause and consequence. High levels
of debt do not inherently alter borrower’s behavior or incentives, and most importantly,
debt relief would not prevent renewed debt accumulation, low investment and low growth.
Distinguishing between these two possibilities is obviously of paramount importance, if only
for policy reasons.
The empirical literature on debt andg r o w t hh a sf o l l o w e dt w os t r a n d s .Aﬁrst set of pa-
pers have attempted to test directly the potential crowding-out eﬀect of debt on investment.
The second approach ﬁts in the empirical growth literature, and investigates the reduced
form (conditional) eﬀects of debt on growth in cross-country regressions, with particular
focus on the presence of non-linear relations. Cohen (1993) ﬁnds that the level of debt
had no signiﬁcant impact on investment during the debt crisis of the early eighties. Over
the same period however, the surprise increase in debt payments correlated negatively with
6The benchmark model in this literature is Barro’s (1979) model of optimal level of public debt where
debt is used to smooth the eﬀect of distortionary taxation.
6investment, thus suggesting a crowding out eﬀect. In contrast, Warner (1992) shows that
some signiﬁcant determinants of investment which are unrelated to debt can explain well
the decline observed in highly indebted countries in the eighties. In particular, the combi-
nation of an increase in world interest rates and a fall in commodity prices can account for
most of the observed decline in investment.7
Patillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002) [henceforth PPR] follow the alternative route. They
estimate the conditional correlation between debt and growth in the context of standard
panel growth regressions, and investigate whether the sign reverts at high enough debt
levels. They ﬁnd clear evidence that debt becomes detrimental for growth in highly indebted
economies, and quantify the threshold levels in the thus conﬁrmed debt Laﬀer curve using
a variety of debt measures.
As will become clear, parts of this paper are largely inspired by PPR. One key diﬀerence
however pertains to the actual estimates of debt levels beyond which the marginal eﬀects
of debt become negative. PPR’s results suggest the marginal eﬀects of debt are negative
for face values larger than 30 to 115 percent of exports, or 5 to 90 percent of GDP, and for
present values larger than 30 to 295 percent of exports, or 5 to 50 percent of GDP. The
imprecision in their results may be due to their using quadratic functional forms, or spline
estimators that select the threshold level on the basis of goodness of ﬁt criteria (R-squared).8
In contrast, the kernel approach we adopt enables more precision, in that it identiﬁes the
very ﬁrst sample where debt correlates negatively with growth, when countries and years
are ranking by increasing level of indebtedness. The median debt in that sample indicates
the threshold of interest, which does not depend on the arbitrary choice of a functional
form.
Finally, Clements, Bhattacharya and Nguyen (2003) estimate a quadratic relation be-
tween debt and growth, in a sample of low income countries. Their estimates point to an
important role for public investment, which they argue high levels of debt tend to crowd
out.
3D a t a
Of crucial importance for our purposes is the strategy we adopt to capture a country’s level
of indebtedness. We focus on measures of gross external debt, for a sample of developing
economies that includes low and middle income according to the World Bank classiﬁcation.
Financial ﬂows are largely unilateral over our sample for a vast majority of developing
economies, which justiﬁes our focus on gross measures.9 As is well known, a large proportion
of debt in developing economies is also external. At the very least, this is the component of
debt that relief programs propose to target, and thus presumably the most relevant from the
standpoint of discussing debt overhang. We use two measures: Total Outstanding External
7More precisely, estimating the determinants of investment to GDP ratios (debt excluded) before the
debt crisis performs well out-of-sample during the high debt period.
8In Patillo, Poirson and Ricci (2003), the same authors use growth accounting techniques to identify
the sources of the growth eﬀects of debt. They conclude that debt deteriorates growth via lower capital
accumulation and a fall in Total Factor Productivity.
9Information on net debt is also substantially harder to come by for the type of coverage we endeavor.
7Debt (TOD), taken from the Global Development Finance dataset, which tracks the face
v a l u eo ft h es t o c ko fe x t e r n a ld e b t ,a n daP r esent Value measure (PV), computed as the
discounted sum of future external debt payments. The former is standard in the empirical
literature on debt, whereas the latter is more recent and relies on speciﬁc assumptions
regarding the discount rates and amortization proﬁles. PPR use both and so do we. We do
however use two PV measures, one constructed by Easterly (2001) (PVE) and the second
by Dikhanov (2004), PVY.
The two measures diﬀer in three ways. PVE builds from aggregate country-level data
on the terms of borrowing, whereas PVY is based on loan-by-loan data that are aggregated
up to the country level. In addition, PVY allows for currency-speciﬁc and time-varying
discount rates. Unlike PVE, it is however restricted to public and publicly guaranteed
debt. While this is a narrower measure than PVE, it will also provi d es o m er o b u s t n e s s
checks on the importance of debt ownership. Both measures assume a linear amortization
schedule.
We follow PPR and construct two ratios for each debt measure, expressed relative to
GDP or to exports. The ratio of debt to exports captures the external resources eﬀectively
available to cover external debt liabilities, and is often used by practitioners, but it is also
more sensitive to term of trade shocks, and thus more volatile, than ratios to GDP
The rest of our data are standard, but oﬀer relatively broad coverage. We construct
a panel of observations for 87 developing economies over the period 1969-2002, which we
use in two empirical exercises. First in standard growth regressions, based on three- or
ﬁve-year averages; second in an event study where we use all the available time variation.
Our control variables in the growth analysis a r ec l a s s i ca n di n s p i r e df r o mt h er o b u s ts e t s
proposed in Levine and Renelt (1992).10 They include initial income, openness to trade,
population growth, secondary schooling and the growth rate of the terms of trade. We also
experimented with the ﬁscal balance, with no changes in conclusions. Construction of these
variables is standard; the sources used are the World Development Indicators, the World
Economic Outlook and the International Financial Statistics.
I nt h ee v e n ts t u d y ,w et r a c kt h er e s p o n s eo v e rt i m eo fi n v e s t m e n t ,m a c r o e c o n o m i cp o l i c y ,
and the terms of borrowing. Of these, only investment is readily available and its measure
relatively uncontroversial. We choose to investigate the dynamic response of two policy
related variables: inﬂation and government expenditures. If the conduct of economic policy
does indeed deteriorate at high levels of debt, we conjecture that at least one of these
measures will show a systematic response. We also include an index computed by the World
Bank, the Country Performance International Assessment, or CPIA, meant to summarize in
one number an assessment of the overall quality of policy stance.11 Because we are interested
in the terms under which debt is contracted, we ﬁnally bring in additional information from
Global Development Finance publications, with a view to isolating changes in the rate of
interest for diﬀerent countries and debt levels. In particular, we collect the value of new
10Doppelhofer, Miller and Sala-i-Martin (2004) recently used Bayesian techniques to isolate an alternative,
updated set of control variables. The approach is however purely cross-sectional, and its results cannot be
used in the present context where within-country growth determinants are of the essence. For instance, the
most robust correlates of economic growth include the extents of confucianistic or protestant religions, or
geographic binary variables, none of which lend themselves to a panel estimation.
11These data are conﬁdential.
8loan agreements contracted by either private or oﬃcial creditors, as well as the average rate
a tw h i c ht h e ya r ec o n t r a c t e d . 12
Finally, several institutional factors can aﬀect the relationship between external debt
and growth, as well as the onset of an overhang episode. We seek to characterize the
institutional arrangements likely to result in both high indebtedness and low growth. We
investigate the role of government eﬃciency, as institutions prone to tolerate the oﬃcial
squandering of resources are likely to hamper growth while they also facilitate debt build-
up. We use the measure of bureaucratic quality constructed in the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), as well as government eﬀectiveness, one of the Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi (2004) (KK) indicators.
4A D e b t L a ﬀer Curve
We ﬁrst revisit the role of debt as implied by standard growth regressions, paying particular
attention to timing issues. We then introduce our kernel estimator to characterize a debt
Laﬀer curve with as little parametric assumptions as possible. Finally, we discuss the dis-
crepancies that arise when comparing between- and within-countries estimates. We relate
these diﬀerences to the role of institutions, and investigate which tend to result simultane-
o u s l yi nh i g hd e b ta n dl o wg r o w t h
4.1 Debt and Growth Regressions
Debt overhang should prevail only for high enough levels of indebtedness. Below that, the
relation between debt and growth is theoretically ambiguous. For instance Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) show, in an augmented Solow growth model, that access to foreign borrowing
leads to a faster rate of convergence. In that context however the role of external debt
should be entirely reﬂected in the rate of investment and should not have an independent
eﬀect of growth. Debt ﬁnances investment, and thus fosters growth, but no direct eﬀect is
discernible. For this reason, we omit investment from the set of control variables in what
follows. We want to allow for a possible channel that works via investment, since this is
one of the prominent theoretical possibilities.13
For purposes of comparison with the existing empirical literature, we ﬁrst brieﬂy reassess
the link between debt and growth in the context of a linear panel approach using non-
overlapping windows of three- and ﬁve-year.14 We consider the general growth speciﬁcation
yit+1 − yit = γDit + Xitβ0 + ηi + ζt + εit (1)
where yit is the log of per capita GDP, Dit ad e b tr a t i o ,Xit a vector of control variables
and ηi and ζt are country and time ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. There are six measures of
12These data include new money lent as part of restructuring deals, and thus does not strictly focus on
the terms of purely new contracted debt.
13In fact, including investment yields overall similar results, with perhaps slightly higher estimated over-
hang thresholds. This indicates that investment is a relevant channel for overhang eﬀects, but not the only
one, which is conﬁrmed later in the paper.
14With three-year windows, the dataset includes up to eleven time units from 1969-1972 to 1999-2002.
With ﬁve-year windows, the dataset includes up to seven times unit from 1971-1975 to 1976-2000.
9Dit: we normalize each of our debt measure, total outstanding debt and the two alternative
present value measures (PVE or PVY) with either the value of exports or nominal GDP.
The set of control variables, in turn, includes: population growth, secondary schooling,
investment to GDP and the growth rate in terms of trade. We estimate equation (1) using
three techniques: i) Ordinary Least Squares, ii) Fixed Eﬀects, and iii) a GMM system
estimator. The GMM estimator controls for the bias resulting from the correlation between
the lagged dependent variable and the ﬁxed eﬀect. The GMM system estimator corrects for
the imprecision of the diﬀerence estimator by jointly estimating equation (1) in diﬀerence
and in level. The set of instruments used with GMM are lagged levels for the diﬀerence
equations and lagged diﬀerences for the level equation.
As i m i l a ra p p r o a c h e dw a sf o l l o w e db yP P R .A ni m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence concerns the treat-
ment of the potential endogeneity in the debt and growth relation. Speciﬁcally, it is crucial
to separate the period used to measure GDP growth from that used to measure indebted-
ness as a ratio of this very same GDP. A period of high growth will mechanically reduce
the debt to GDP ratio and induce a negative relation that bears no relation to overhang
mechanisms.15 In what follows we compare the relation between average GDP growth and
debt ratios, where they are both computed over the same period, to that between initial
debt and subsequent growth. We show using average values tend to generate a negative bias
in the estimation of the debt eﬀect. Using initial debt ratio is also more consistent with the
theoretical prediction that relates high debt levels to lower subsequent growth performance.
Further, we present results based on a panel constructed using ﬁve-year averages, in order
to ﬁlter out the eﬀect business cycles ﬂuctuations. Tables 1, 2 and 3 summarize our ﬁndings.
Table 1 presents the results of the estimation using Present Value of Debt (PVY) and
three-year windows. Two features emerge. First, a negative and signiﬁcant link between
debt and growth appears only in OLS estimations; second the point estimate on debt is
reduced when initial rather than average debt ratios are used. This will be a regularity
across all debt measures.
Regarding the control variables, we ﬁnd that the convergence terms is negative and
signiﬁcant in all regressions. The coeﬃcient for the other variables tend to exhibit the
expected sign but are not always signiﬁcant.16 From the Sargan test and second-order
Serial Correlation test, we conclude that overall validity of the instruments used in GMM
estimation cannot be rejected.
Table 2 summarizes the eﬀect of debt on growth when the regressions reported in Table
1 are performed with various measures of debt ratios. The reduction of the debt coeﬃcient
when we use initial rather than average ratio is a common pattern across all regressions.
Table 3 presents regressions results obtained with ﬁve-year non-overlapping windows and
using initial debt ratios. Only one estimation out of eighteen exhibits a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the initial debt ratio on growth. Overall, we can conclude that there
15This problem is not solved when internal instruments are used in the GMM estimation. The validity of
the GMM identiﬁcation relies on the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables, which is
not fulﬁlled under the scenario we discuss here.
16The relatively low t-statistics in the two steps GMM system estimation can be largerly attributed to
the use of the Windmeijer (2005) small sample correction.
10is no robust linear evidence of a negative relationship between debt and growth in the full
sample. Of course, this may well reﬂect the prevalence of non-linearities.
4.2 Two Kernel Estimators
In this section, we propose a non-parametric empirical strategy meant to assess the existence
of a debt Laﬀer curve, while imposing as little structure on functional forms as possible. In
addition, we seek to identify a sub-sample of country-years in which overhang mechanisms
may be operating.
We use two kernel estimators. The ﬁrst one derives from sequential estimations of equa-
tion (1) on rolling sub-samples of observations, ranked by their initial level of indebtedness.
N country-years observations are ranked by increasing values of (initial) debt ratios. Let
j denote the rank of each country-year observation according to this ordering. The kernel
bandwidth, denoted by l, is chosen arbitrarily, but robustness along this margin is ensured.17
We then estimate equation (1) on the ﬁrst l observations, roll the sub-sample over by one
unit and perform a new estimation on the thus modiﬁed sample. We stop when we reach the
sub-sample of l observations with highest indebtedness. Each sub-sample is characterized
by its mid-point debt level f Dj, the median (initial) debt ratio computed for each window.
Formally, for each j ∈ (1,N− l +1 ) ,w ee s t i m a t e
yit+1 − yit = γjDit + Zitβ0
j + εit, (i,t) ⊂ Ωl
j (2)
where Zit =[ Xit,ηi,ζt] and Ωl
j denotes the sub-sample j of l country-years observations.
Each individual coeﬃcient is derived from a parametric linear estimation, but we do
not impose any functional forms on the relationship between growth and debt, nor on that
between growth and the other control variables. Crucially, estimates of γj at high levels
of debt do not depend on observations at low debt levels. This is consistent with theory,
where the onset of an overhang episode corresponds to dramatic changes in incentives once,
and only once, the debt threshold is reached. This independence feature will be absent from
any parametric estimation of non-linearities performed over the full sample.
While this approach has the simplicity aﬀorded by a “rolling window” interpretation, it
does not go without problems. First and foremost, it allows for all co-variates to depend non-
parametrically on debt levels. This complicates interpretation, as estimates of the impact
of debt on growth taken from successive samples are not directly comparable. A diﬀerence
could arise because other co-variates also change in signiﬁcance or in importance. Second,
even if the linear coeﬃcients were stable across samples, the presence of a non-linearity
creates a bias, which in turn can aﬀect all estimates. We address these concerns using the
partial-linear kernel estimator introduced in Robinson (1988). The approach involves a se-
quence of parametric and non-parametric regressions, with straightforward intuition. The
non-linearity is ﬁrst eliminated from both dependent and independent variables, through bi-
variate kernel estimations. Ordinary least-squares using the two resulting residuals provides
unbiased estimates of the linear coeﬃcients. With these in hands, the dependent variable is
17We experimented with bandwidths going from 150 to 300 observations. Unsurprisingly, the shape of
the Laﬀer curve smoothens as l increases, but our main result of a a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of debt on
growth at high debt levels always prevails.
11purged of its linear determinants, and the residual used to estimate the non-linear relation
of interest.
More formally, we ﬁrst use simple kernel techniques to estimate E{(yit+1 − yit) /D it}
and E{Zit /D it} for all (i,t) ⊂ Ωl
j, . We then construct the corresponding residuals
(yit+1−yit)−E{(yit+1−yit) /D it} and Zit −E{Zit /D it}, and use least squares to obtain
unbiased estimates of βj. Finally, we implement a kernel estimator of (yit+1−yit)−Zitβ0
j on
debt. The approach addresses the issues created by the hybrid nature of the relation we seek
to identify, but at some eﬃciency costs. To ascertain signiﬁcance, we present bootstrapped
standard errors.18
Using GMM estimators in either kernel estimation is in practice unwieldy. Indeed,
the ordering of our observations by country-year does not guarantee the presence of the
relevant lags necessary to build up the internal instrument matrix.19 We are therefore
restricted to kernel estimations based on OLS and Fixed Eﬀects. When using the latter, each
individual coeﬃcient estimate is based on a within-country estimation, but as the sample of
country-years changes across windows, variation in estimates also reﬂects between-countries
diﬀerences.20
In contrast, PPR look for non-linearities imposing one of two functional forms. First
they investigate the signiﬁcance of a linear-quadratic component, and second they impose
a piecewise aﬃne function or linear spline. But the linear-quadratic speciﬁcation can be
misleading in that it can confuse monotonic concavity with non-monotonicity. Furthermore,
linear quadratic functional forms tend to deliver estimation results that can depend heavily
on extrema.21 The piecewise linear estimation solves some of these issues, but it can deliver
vastly diﬀerent results depending on the number of assumed discontinuity points. In general,
a drawback of non-linear parametric speciﬁcations is they often lead to conclusions based
on out-of sample thresholds. This is especially problematic when the aim is to select sub-
samples of observations with certain properties, as is the case for the purposes of our event
study.
Our kernel estimates are derived from a panel of ﬁve-year averages, using the initial
values of total outstanding debt or the updated measure of debt present value constructed
by Dikhanov (2004), PVY. Figures 1 and 2 present the kernel estimations for ratios of debt
to GDP and to exports, respectively. The bandwidth is set to l = 200. On each scatterplot,
mid-point level of debt ratios (f Dj)j∈(1,N−l+1) are on the horizontal axis and estimates of the
partial eﬀect of debt on growth (γj)∈(1,N−l+1) on the vertical axis. For each ﬁgure, the left
and right panels report estimates as implied by OLS and panel Fixed Eﬀects, respectively.
18We follow Yatchew (2003) , and bootstrap the residuals corresponding to the last kernel in the procedure.
We simulate 10,000 repetitions, with replacement, for each step of the kernel.
19In addition, the poor small sample properties of GMM make it undesirable to run this estimator on
truncated slices of our initial panel, with each much fewer observations.
20The Monte Carlo simulations in Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) suggest that our inability to use a GMM
estimator may not be problematic after all. Their results suggest the archetypical growth regression is
actually best estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, even in the presence of country-speciﬁc intercepts and
a lagged dependent variable. GMM estimations suﬀer from small sample biases, whereas the within-group
estimator exacerbates measurement error. In our case, the additional covariate, debt, demands that we
investigate the importance of country ﬁxed eﬀects, in order to isolate the dynamic impact of increasing debt
on growth.
21Especially when applied on logarithms.
12Points in bold correspond to estimates of γj signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, at the 10
percent conﬁdence level.
OLS-based kernel estimates suggest debt starts having signiﬁcant deleterious eﬀects on
growth when it reaches just above half of GDP. With ﬁxed eﬀects on Figure 1, the non-
linearity exhibits a similar pattern but the threshold level now increases to around 60 percent
of GDP. In this region the point estimate for γj is around −1.7. This implies an increase in
the debt to GDP ratio by a factor of 1.5 translates into an annual GDP growth rate lower
by 0.7 percent.22 Interestingly, the link between debt and growth becomes insigniﬁcant
at high debt levels when country ﬁxed eﬀects are included: it is largely because of time
invariant controls that high debt tends to be associated to in low growth. The Figure’s
lower panel presents the kernel estimation results for the ratio of debt face value to exports.
As in Figure 1, controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects tends to substantially increase the range over
which a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between debt and growth exists, from 150
to 200 percent of exports. A noticeable diﬀerence is that coeﬃcients γj do not exhibit a
similar downward pattern in OLS based kernel estimations. This might by explained by
cross-country diﬀerences in export levels, which are captured imperfectly by the control
variables and, in particular, by trade openness. In fact, when ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled
for, the kernel estimation of debt to exports coeﬃcients do exhibit a downward pattern
again.
The results for the ratios involving the present value of debt are reported on Figure 2.
The same phenomena are apparent: the estimated overhang range shifts to the right when
country speciﬁc intercepts are allowed for. OLS suggests a maximum in the debt Laﬀer
curve occurs when the present value of debt reaches around 30 percent of GDP, but it is
closer to 40 percent with country speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. OLS estimates for the ratio to exports
are once again not downward sloping, but this is corrected when the kernel implements a
within-group estimator. Interestingly, both present value measures also point to a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect of debt on growth at low debt levels, i.e. below 20 of GDP and 50
percent of exports.23
The debt relief initiative has been targeting especially low income economies, where
overhang issues are argued to be most prevalent. It is therefore of particular interest to
reproduce our analysis inside and outside of the sample formed by the 45 countries catego-
rized as low income by the World Bank. Figures 3 and 4 report the corresponding estimates.
Even though the conclusions are somewhat weakened in reduced samples, the distinction
according to income levels is clearly relevant.24 While signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients
continue to prevail in the sample of low income countries, they are completely absent from
the complementary set of countries. This suggests the view that low income countries are
disproportionately aﬀected by debt overhang problems is justiﬁed, at least on grounds of
growth eﬀects. It remains to be seen whether the mechanisms at play are indeed consistent
with theory: comparing Figures 3 and 4 suggests the main reason why low income countries
may experience overhang is simply because they are more indebted on average.
22I.e. ln(1.5)*1.7
23The actual number of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients represented on the Figures cannot straighforwardly be
interpreted as reﬂecting the number of actual observations driving the evidence on debt overhang. Rather,
each signiﬁcantly negative point in the kernel reﬂects a sample where overhang prevails, whose size equals
the bandwidth used in the estimator.
24Our initial sample splits roughly half way between the two income categories.
13Figure 5 presents the debt Laﬀer curves as implied by the “double residuals” kernel
estimator. All estimations allow for country eﬀects. Several results are worth pointing
out. First, estimates are rather imprecise. This is inherent to the estimator, and possibly
worsened by relatively small bandwidths.25 Imprecision is the reason why we privilege the
results implied by the “rolling window” lowess kernel. We adopt a prudent approach in this
paper and would rather investigate whether a negative coeﬃcient in a growth regression
does indeed reﬂect overhang mechanisms, than perhaps mistakenly dismiss an insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient. That said however, the “double residuals” estimates are strikingly close to our
ﬁrst set of results. In two cases, the coeﬃcient estimates become signiﬁcantly negative at
virtually identical levels of indebtedness: 60 percent of GDP for debt face value, and 35
percent for debt present value. Given the ineﬃciency of the estimator, it is remarkable
that such similar conclusions obtain. Abstracting from signiﬁcance issues, minimum point
estimates for measures based on exports are actually reached for levels of indebtedness not
dissimilar to what is implied by the lowess estimator, i.e. when debt face value reaches
between 170 and 200 percent of exports, and its present value reaches 150 to 170 percent
of exports. In this last case, the estimator’s low eﬃciency makes it impossible to ascertain
whether the threshold is a local extremum.
The kernel approach has three merits. First, it provides some support for a non-linear
relation between debt and growth, or at least for deleterious eﬀects of debt at high levels.
The evidence is general and not built on speciﬁc parametric assumptions. Second, in this
speciﬁc case, the approach illustrates the importance of time-invariant country character-
istics in jointly aﬀecting economic growth and indebtedness: a Laﬀer curve prevails for a
much smaller set of countries, and for much higher debt levels, once country speciﬁcf e a t u r e s
are accounted for. In other words, the negative relation is partly driven by omitted time in-
variant (institutional?) variables which drive debt up but growth down. With ﬁxed eﬀects,
the relation between debt and growth becomes more elusive, perhaps partly because of the
available menu of estimators. This supports a dynamic, within-country view of debt over-
hang, whereby debt build-up opens the door to pathological overhang episodes irrespective
of the quality of the institutional environment. This of course does not mean institutional
quality does not aﬀect the severity of an overhang episode. The next Section asks which
institutional variables appear to belong in that list. Third, the kernel approach provides
an objective criterion to isolate a sample of countries where debt overhang is estimated to
occur in sample. This is crucial for the event study we describe in Section 5.
4.3 The Role of Institutions
In this Section, we seek to identify which institutions tend to jointly explain high debt
and low growth. We focus on a sub-sample of observations where OLS estimates predict
as i g n i ﬁcantly negative relation between debt and growth, and augment the speciﬁcation
with institutional controls. Relevant institutional arrangements are those which aﬀect the
signiﬁcance of the debt-growth estimates.26
25The results reported correspond to a bandwidth of 200 observations. We experimented with up to
300 observations, without noticeable change in the bootstrapped standard errors. Similarly, increasing the
number of repetitions beyond 10,000 has little eﬀect on the bands.
26We also experimented with augmenting our kernel with relevant institutional controls. Predictably, the
resulting relation resembled a mid-point between the OLS and the Fixed-Eﬀects curves.
14Without ﬁxed eﬀects, the kernel estimates point to a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient
when debt face value ranges between 30 and 250 percent of GDP.27 We focus on the sub-
sample formed by this range of indebtedness, and ask what institutional controls best mimic
the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects in Figure 2, i.e. act to weaken the estimated coeﬃcient on debt.
We consider the benchmark OLS regression and augment it with a single institutional
variable at a time. As most of the institutional variables are not available for the early part
of the sample, we take a timeless perspective and use country means for all the institutional
indicators. This approach, consistent with the objective of uncovering speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects,
is valid under the assumption of a high degree of persistence in institutional variables.
Formally, we estimate
yit+1 − yit = γDit + Xitβ0 + Ii + ζt + εit
where Ii is a time-invariant institutional variable.
Results are reported on Table 4 for the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) syn-
thetic institutional indexes, which include voice and accountability, political rights, cor-
ruption, government eﬀectiveness and rule of law. A striking result appears. Government
eﬀectiveness and rule of law knock all signiﬁcance out of the coeﬃcient on debt. The same
is however not true of any time invariant control, as introducing the other three KK in-
stitutional variables leaves the link between debt and growth virtually unchanged. These
ﬁndings are consistent with theory. Debt overhang is less likely to occur with more eﬀective
governments and within a better legal and contractual environment. It might still happen,
but will do so at higher levels of indebtedness.
Table 5 reports similar results with ICRG average indexes. An index of bureaucratic
quality is the only variable that aﬀects signiﬁcantly the debt and growth relationship. Nei-
ther the level of democratic rights, nor the occurrence of conﬂicts or ethnic tensions alter
the negative link between debt and growth.
5 D e b tO v e r h a n g :A nE v e n tS t u d y
We use the non-parametric results to identify country-years where an overhang episode
is estimated to have happened in sample. In other words, we isolate a panel of country-
years where we know the link between debt and growth to be negative. If the mechanisms
underpinning debt overhang are to be observed anywhere in available data, it is bound to
be in this sample where we know debt has within-country deleterious eﬀects on growth. In
choosing these samples, we opt for prudence. We investigate the possibility of overhang as
soon as one of our estimator points to a negative and signiﬁcant debt-growth relation, rather
than dismissing the argument if and when the estimates are not unanimous. In fact, since
the “double residuals” estimator tends to lack eﬃciency, we focus on the thresholds implied
by the simple rolling window, lest we mistakenly reject overhang phenomena. (Fixed eﬀects)
kernel estimation results imply the following threshold levels for our various measures of
indebtedness:
27This excludes the nine country-observations year with highest debt to GDP ratio in our sample. Inclusion
of these extreme values results in insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates in Figure 1. Chances are these are outliers,
with ratios of debt in excess of 500 percent of GDP, or even sometimes 1,000 as Nicaragua in the late 90s.
15Ratio Threshold
Total Debt to GDP 60%
Total Debt to Exports 200%
Present Value of Debt to GDP (PVY) 40%
Present Value of Debt to Exports (PVY) 140%
We seek to characterize the dynamic response of investment, policy and the terms of
borrowing before, during and after the onset of an overhang episode. Thus, a deﬁnition for
an overhang episode is called for, that distinguishes situations where debt is continuously
high except for one or two exceptionally high growth years for instance, or where debt is
on the whole low, but passes above the threshold for a few years in a row. We arbitrarily
label an overhang episode a sequence of at least eight consecutive years above the threshold,
following ﬁve consecutive years below.28 Imposing at least eight years above the threshold
rules out conﬁgurations where a high debt to GDP ratio only reﬂects a decline in real
GDP during a business cycle recession. Requiring ﬁve years below screens out countries
permanently located in a high debt trap.29 The notion of an “overhang episode” should
be understood in a hypothetical way, as the objective of this Section is precisely to assess
whether these episodes exhibit a pattern consistent with overhang theories.
We follow a standard procedure.30 First we identify country-years constituting overhang
episodes. Second, we demean all the variables of interest, controlling for both time and
country averages.31 Third, we average the resulting series across all overhang episodes. The
average path of each variables and the standard error band is displayed on a sixteen-year
window going from t = −5 to +8,w h e r et =1corresponds to the onset of the overhang
episode. We track the responses of investment, macroeconomic policy and the terms of
borrowing. The results of the study are presented in Figures 6 to 12, and are discussed over
the next few sections. Each Figure reports the responses of a variable of interest under the
four alternative deﬁnitions of an overhang episode, according to either TOD to GDP, TOD
to exports, PVY to GDP or PVY to exports ratios.
5.1 Overhang Countries
We list all overhang countries, as well as the onset date in Appendix A. Using the ratio
of PVY to GDP, we identify 37 episodes of debt overhang in our sample of 87 low and
middle income countries. Of these, 23 are in Africa, 12 in Latin America and only 2 in
Asia.32 The mean real per capita GDP at the inception of each debt overhang episode is
$877, the poorest being Ethiopia ($111) and the richest Venezuela ($3500). The historical
concentration of episodes over-represents the eighties (24 episodes). This selection partly
derives from our deﬁnition of overhang episodes.
28We experimented with imposing ﬁve or ten years after the threshold, without substantial changes in the
conclusions.
29We also permit one year spent above or below the threshold during the event years. Thus, four out of
ﬁve years spent below the threshold, or seven out of eight years above the threshold is still considered a
relevant event.
30See for instance Henry and Arslanalp (forthcoming).
31For interest rates, we actually demean the spread with US ten-year Treasury Bills.
32The Asian cases are the Philippines (1985) and Syria (1986).
16Using total debt to GDP, we ﬁnd an almost identical number of episodes (36), which
also reﬂects the predominance of African Countries (24). The average per capita income in
this sample is slightly lower ($800). There are 25 countries that exhibit overhang episodes
a c c o r d i n gt oe i t h e rd e b tm e a s u r e . 33 The lists are overall similar when considering deﬁnitions
based on the ratio of PVY (TOD) to exports, with 38 and 39 countries, respectively. These
include large countries such as Argentina, Brazil or India that do not experience overhang
episodes according to debt to GDP ratios. In addition, geographic and time coverage tend
to be more balanced according to these criteria.
5.2 The Response of Investment
The common hypothesis derived from overhang theories is that countries experience a re-
duction in investment once they reach a high enough debt level, either directly through an
anticipation of the costs associated with a potential default or as a response to a deteriora-
tion of policies as debtor countries lose incentives to follow sound macro policies. Figure 6
provides some support for this hypothesis.
For all measures of indebtedness, investment follows a clear and signiﬁcant downward
trend over the fourteen years considered around the event. Investment is (signiﬁcantly)
above or around its mean in the pre-overhang period, but signiﬁcantly below afterwards.
In addition, in three out of four cases, investment actually builds up prior to the overhang
date, which argues against the possibility that an investment slump actually predates the
overhang and explains the debt build-up. Investment does not fall in earnest until the
overhang date, or a couple of years thereafter. For instance, when indebtedness is measured
by the face value of debt as a proportion of GDP, investment does fall precipitously at
t =0 , as predicted by theory. For alternative measures based on debt face value to exports
or debt present value to GDP, investment actually increases slightly at the overhang date,
before collapsing to its lowest level one or two years later.34
5.3 The Response of Policy
Figures 7 and 8 plot the typical response in government expenditures and inﬂation before
and during an overhang episode. Here the evidence is more mixed. Government expendi-
tures show no systematic pattern, while we do observe a clear and signiﬁcant increase in
inﬂation during the overhang period in three out of four cases. The response of inﬂation is
in all cases occurring at positive values of t: entering the overhang zone tends to be associ-
ated with increasing inﬂation, as it would if price stability became less of a policy priority.
The absence of any response in government expenditures might actually reﬂect a policy
deterioration, as a sound macroeconomic response to debt build-up might be to attempt
and reduce the level of public expenditures.35
33For these countries, the timing of episodes may change slightly accross the two debt measures but usually
by no more than two years
34T h en u m b e ro fo b s e r v a t i o n su s e dt oc o m p u t eF i g u r e6c a nb ed i ﬀerent from the total number of events,
as investment data are not available everywhere debt org r o w t hd a t aa r e .T h i si st r u et h r o u g h o u tt h ee v e n t
study.
35In fact, one of our criterion suggests such a contraction in spending in the overhang years.
17Figure 9 plots the response of the CPIA index which reﬂects a (subjective) World Bank
ranking of the overall quality of economic policy. The response in CPIA is close to mirroring
inﬂation, possibly because it ﬁgures prominently in the list of ingredients World Bank
economists use to provide an assessment of the quality of overall policy. In three out of
four cases, policy deteriorates after the overhang. While these results are less unanimous
than those quantifying an investment eﬀect, and also more diﬃcult to interpret, they do
provide some support to the hypothesis that overhang episodes coincide with a noticeable
deterioration in macroeconomic policies.
5.4 The Response of the Terms of Borrowing: Interest Rates and Com-
mitments
Figures 10 plots the dynamic response in the interest rate spread, measured by the (de-
meaned) diﬀerence between local rates as implied by Global Development Finance sources,
and the yield on a ten-year Treasury Bill. Interestingly, the onset of debt overhang appears
to be characterized by a fall in spreads. What is more, in all cases this easing of borrowing
conditions tends to follow a tightening, with interest rates actually increasing prior to the
event threshold. This runs exactly contrary to the theoretical prediction that an overhang
problem appears because of prohibitive borrowing terms. Here, debt seems to become more
concessional as the overhang zone is reached.
A natural explanation for this rests in possible changes in the composition of debt, as if
private investors exit the market, and are replaced by an increasing share of multi-lateral
agencies lending at concessional rates. But this would suggest debt relief would have hardly
any easing impact on the conditions at which highly-indebted countries can borrow, and
indeed would if anything worsen the terms of borrowing. Figures 11 and 12 plot the average
dynamic path of (the value of) new commitments arising from the private and the oﬃcial
sectors, respectively. Private commitments fall precipitously in all cases for non-negative
values of t; what is more, the overhang is preceded by a build-up of private lending, so
that our event study is not merely capturing a trend “rush for the exit” amongst private
investors. In stark contrast, oﬃcial commitments increase in value after the threshold.36
The change in the composition of debt with the onset of overhang is actually not phrased
out in any theory that we are aware of, but it is presumably what exonerates highly-
indebted countries from having to face exorbitant borrowing conditions. We later present
evidence that the servicing of debt actually falls at positive values of t as well, which is also
consistent with the terms of borrowing becoming increasingly concessional in the overhang
zone. Importantly, this also means that debt relief could actually increase debt service and
h a v et h et y p eo fc r o w d i n go u te ﬀects on investment that are customarily ascribed to a high
debt burden.
6R o b u s t n e s s
We check robustness along two important dimensions. First, we verify whether the dynamics
we identify are not caused by global shocks, for instance to interest rates, that would act to
36Changes in private lending are actually close to one order of magnitude larger than oﬃcial ones.
18lower investment, particularly in highly indebted economies forced to dedicate a large share
of their resources to servicing debt. Second, we exclude from our sample all the countries
that experienced sizeable rescheduling in our sample.
6.1 Interest Rate Shocks
If t =1tends to correspond on average with a period of increasing interest rates worldwide,
it is possible that the fall in investment that we capture should be a mere manifestation
that increasing debt service makes it particularly hard for highly-indebted economies to
invest. In addition, rising interest rates could also account for falling output (and perhaps
exports), and so explain a sudden jump in debt ratios. And since we use interest rate
spreads, we do not capture a world increase in rates. Here we oﬀer two rebuﬀals to this
alternative scenario. First, we provide evidence that debt service actually does not rise
during our average event (which is consistent with falling interest rates). Second, we provide
sample splits showing that for similar levels of indebtedness, diﬀerent countries display
diﬀerent investment responses .Heterogeneous responses -for a given debt level- rule out
the possibility that our evidence stems from indiscriminate crowding out of investment,
mechanically caused by high debt service.
Figure 13 plots the time path of debt service. There is no evidence that the debt burden
increases for positive values of t. In two cases, debt service increases in the ﬁrst years of the
event, but if anything it turns downward in the overhang zone, undoubtedly thanks to the
concessional borrowing conditions we document in the previous section. This is inconsistent
with the view that would ascribe the observed fall in investment to mechanical crowding
out eﬀects.
On Figure 14, we plot the response of investment for two sub-samples of events, according
to the enforcement of property rights as measured by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2001).37 Arguably, property rights are relevant theoretically, since they may capture the
ability creditors have to monitor and sanction debtors’ behavior, and thus they may reﬂect
the gravity of an overhang problem. And indeed, the fall in investment is clearly subdued
in countries with good enforcement, between two and three times smaller than in the rest of
the overhang sample. While investment tends to fall as well even with good property rights,
the relevance of the actual overhang date is much less clear. The response of investment is
much more severe with poor property rights, which is consistent with theory, and rules out
the possibility that our event study merely captures the chronology of a world recession.
Finally, Figure 15 reports the time path of investment in two samples, characterized by
the World Bank classiﬁcation of low income countries.38 Consistent with the non-parametric
results, debt overhang appears to set mostly in low income countries, where investment falls
by the largest proportion in most cases.39 An explanation of our results based on a global
recession would have diﬃculties accounting for these diﬀerential responses.
37Low enforcement countries are ones with grades of 1 or 2, whereas high ones take values 3, 4 or 5.
38We have between 21 and 23 low income countries in our sample of events, depending on the criterion
used to identify the event.
39In results available upon request, we also investigate the response of interest rates in both samples. The
split continues to be relevant, with most fall in interest rates occurring in the low income countries.
196.2 Rescheduling and Default Episodes
While the bias this would create is ambiguous,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a ts o m eo fo u rr e s u l t sa r e
inﬂuenced by the debt crisis of the 1980’s, and the associated wave of debt rescheduling
programs. Our data reﬂect restructuring programs, and debt ratios may be falling from high
levels because of rescheduling agreements, rather than because countries grow themselves
outside of a debt spiral. If anything, this would bias our results against ﬁnding evidence for
debt overhang, since we would mistakenly exclude from our sample a country with a debt
history that does not ﬁt our criterion because it goes through rescheduling episodes.
In Figure 16, we omit the period from 1979 to 1984 from our sample, and therefore
characterize our chronology on the basis of overhang episodes outside the range customarily
associated with the debt crisis. The response of investment is virtually unchanged.40 Finally,
in Figure 17, we omit from our study all rescheduling episodes targeting more than 5
percent of debt face value. This is meant to ensure the debt ratios in the sample we end
up focusing on are not perturbed by punctual restructuring agreements. As expected,
investment continues to fall markedly at the overhang date.41 These results suggest that
the presence of rescheduling episodes in our benchmark data tends if anything to obscure
the main results of the paper.42
7C o n c l u s i o n
We provide non-parametric evidence supporting a debt Laﬀer curve among 87 developing
economies. Overhang sets in when the face value of debt reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200
percent of exports, or when the present value of debt reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140
percent of exports. Then, initial debt tends to be associated with subsequently low growth.
These thresholds apply within countries, that is accounting for country-speciﬁc institutional
arrangements. This does not mean institutions do not matter for debt and growth. In
particular, we ﬁnd that government eﬀectiveness, the rule of law and bureaucratic quality
all act to limit debt build-up while encouraging economic growth. We provide direct tests
of the theoretical conjecture that high debt worsens incentives. We ﬁnd that investment
collapses in the overhang zone, and the conduct of economic policy deteriorates observably.
However, spreads fall. This is due to oﬃcial lenders taking over from private creditors, and
extending loans at concessional rates. Borrowing conditions do not become exorbitant with
debt overhang because the high interest rates private creditors would impose on overhung
creditors do not happen in equilibrium. Our results suggest that debt relief might have a
stimulating eﬀect on investment, and possibly on economic policy, but would if anything
result in worse borrowing conditions, and thus possibly in a rising debt burden.
40As are the responses of economic policy, interest rates and commitments, which are available upon
r e q u e s tf o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y .
41As indeed do rates and private commitments. Oﬃcial commitments and inﬂation, in turn, increase
markedly. These results are available upon request.
42In results available upon request, we plot the time paths of GDP growth and the terms of trade, as they
could both aﬀect the dynamics of the debt ratios we examine. There is some evidence that the terms of trade
worsen and growth decelerates somewhat prior to the event date. But both tend to recover quickly and rise
throughout the actual overhang dates. This is consistent with the notion that negative terms of trade shocks
or a recession may actually trigger debt overhang. More importantly it suggests the fall in investment and
economic policy deteriorating tend to happen in a relatively mild macroeconomic environment.
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22Table 1 : Present Value of Debt to GDP and Growth: three-year average panel
12 3 4 5 6
[OLS] [OLS] [FE] [FE] [GMM system] [GMM system]
Net Present Value of Debt [PVY]/GDP (avg) -0.606 -0.19 -0.397
[2.66]*** [0.63] [0.47]
Net Present Value of Debt [PVY]/GDP (initial) -0.484 0.217 -0.496
[2.42]** [0.88] [0.65]
Initial GDP per Capita -0.674 -0.598 -6.981 -6.691 -1.933 -1.913
[3.01]*** [2.68]*** [8.46]*** [8.22]*** [2.04]** [2.11]**
Population Growth -21.165 -21.329 1.449 0.965 20.304 25.419
[1.33] [1.31] [0.08] [0.05] [0.58] [0.63]
Secondary Schooling 1.312 1.277 0.021 -0.115 4.93 4.996
[4.94]*** [4.79]*** [0.03] [0.16] [3.07]*** [3.21]***
Terms of Trade Growth 0.017 0.016 0.011 0.01 0.038 0.058
[1.28] [1.23] [0.99] [0.84] [1.07] [1.21]
Trade Openness 1.013 0.935 3.643 3.47 1.21 0.987
[2.24]** [2.07]** [4.43]*** [4.23]*** [1.14] [1.11]
Observations 604 604 604 604 604 604
Sargan P-value 0.62 0.41
Serial Correlation (second order) P-value 0.97 0.82
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5% ***significant at 1% 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
Note: [GMM System]: Two System Estimator with Small Sample Windmejer  (2005) Robust Correction
[PVE]= PV data from B.Easterly; [PVY]: PV data from Yuri Dikhanov
All regressions include time effects
23Table 2 : External Debt and Growth: three-year average panel
12 3
[OLS] [FE] [GMM system]  
 Present Value of Debt [PVY]/Exports (avg) -0.591 -0.93 -0.397
[2.46]* [2.96]** [0.46]
Present Value of Debt [PVY]/Exports (initial) -0.445 -0.325 -0.735
[1.96]* [1.12] [0.89]
Present Value of Debt [PVE]/Exports (avg) -0.454 -1.468 -1.21
[1.55] [3.78]*** [1.33]
Present Value of Debt [PVE]/Exports (initial) -0.175 -0.691 -0.873
[0.62] [1.99]** [0.89]
Total Outstanding Debt/Exports (avg) -0.562 -1.207 -0.178
[1.88]* [3.44]*** [0.17]
Total Outstanding Debt/Exports (initial) -0.408 -0.593 -0.206
[1.45] [1.92]* [0.17]
Present Value of Debt[PVE]/GDP (avg) -0.559 -0.4 -1.292
[1.95]* [1.08] [1.26]
Present Value of Debt [PVE]/GDP (initial) -0.388 0.01 -0.606
[1.48] [0.03] [0.54]
Total Outstanding Debt/GDP (avg) -0.607 -0.378 -0.364
[2.05]* [1.11] [0.30]
Total Outstanding Debt/GDP (initial) -0.541 -0.024 -0.296
[2.04]** [0.08] [0.31]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
Note: [GMM System]: Two System Estimator with Small Sample Windmejer  (2005) Robust Correction
[PVE]= PV data from B.Easterly; [PVY]: PV data from Yuri Dikhanov
Set of Control Variable identical to Table 1 
All regressions include time effects
24Table 3 : External Debt and Growth: 5-year average panel
12 3
[OLS] [FE] [GMM system]
Present Value of Debt [PVY]/GDP (initial) -0.208 0.561 -0.323
[0.99] [2.26]* [0.54]
Present Value of Debt [PVE]/GDP (initial) -0.118 0.28 0.215
[0.47] [0.89] [0.39]
Total Outstanding Debt/GDP (initial) -0.269 0.053 -0.236
[1.19] [0.18] [0.41]
Present Value of Debt [PVY]/Exports (initial) -0.011 0.267 0.051
[0.05] [1.02] [0.08]
Present Value of Debt [PVE]/Exports (initial) 0.298 0.067 0.147
[1.12] [0.20] [0.25]
Total Outstanding Debt/Exports (initial) 0.007 -0.437 0.168
[0.03] [1.42] [0.26]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
Note: [GMM System]: Two System Estimator with Small Sample Windmejer  (2005) Robust Correction
[PVE]= PV data from B.Easterly; [PVY]: PV data from Yuri Dikhanov
Set of Control Variable identical to Table 1 
All regressions include time effects
25Table 4: Kaufman and Kray Controls
123456
[OLS] [OLS] [OLS] [OLS] [OLS] [OLS]
Total Outstanding Debt/GDP (initial) -0.771 -0.771 -0.839 -0.59 -0.581 -0.792
[1.82]* [1.82]* [2.02]* [1.55] [1.43] [2.02]*
Initial GDP per Capita -0.407 -0.526 -0.648 -0.967 -0.911 -0.923
[1.63] [1.93]* [2.53]* [3.96]** [3.65]** [3.69]**
Population Growth -62.015 -53.03 -48.783 -24.355 -32.314 -39.386
[2.19]* [1.78]* [1.73]* [0.95] [1.14] [1.55]
Secondary Schooling 1.027 1.095 1.224 1.034 1.064 1.059
[3.01]** [3.14]** [3.49]** [3.17]** [3.15]** [3.28]**
Trade Openness 0.925 0.929 0.422 0.487 0.261 0.429
[1.51] [1.51] [0.65] [0.85] [0.44] [0.74]










Observations 250 250 250 250 250 250
Robust t statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
26Table 5: International Country Risk Guide  Controls
123456
[OLS] [OLS] [OLS] [OLS] [OLS] [OLS]
Total Outstanding Debt/GDP (initial) -0.912 -0.763 -0.912 -0.887 -0.908 -0.991
[1.80]* [1.52] [1.79]* [1.76]* [1.80]* [1.92]*
Initial GDP per Capita -0.109 -0.283
[0.40] [1.07]
Population Growth -62.641 -63.279 -62.649 -60.607 -66.274 -64.203
[2.12]* [2.18]* [2.12]* [1.99]* [2.16]* [2.21]*
Secondary Schooling 0.477 0.495 0.476 0.432 0.38 0.572
[1.35] [1.38] [1.36] [1.13] [1.08] [1.56]
Trade Openness 1.162 0.936 1.165 1.234 1.369 1.214











Observations 211 211 211 211 211 211
Robust t statistics in brackets
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Figure 4: Kernel Estimates - Non Low Income Countries
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Figure 16:  Robustness (IV) :  Excluding Events between 1979 and 1984 The Response of 
Investment
Figure 17:  Robustness (V) :  Excluding Rescheduling Episodes
The Response of Investment
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